Introduction
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 1 is recurrently presented as a critically needed technology in long-term energy scenarios (e.g., IEA, 2017; Knopf et al., 2013) 2 because it de facto reconciles the existing dependence upon fossil fuels while making achievable the ambitious CO 2 abatement targets required for a 2°C-compatible world. However, CCS faces the reality of a slower-than-anticipated uptake. With few exceptions, to date, large-scale integrated CCS projects have not been commercially deployed, and skepticism regarding the future outlook of that technology (Banks and Boersma, 2015 ) is now increasing. In light of these difficulties, research examining the socio-economic barriers to the deployment of CCS and proposing adapted policy remedies is now gaining momentum.
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For policymakers, a crucial question mark remains to be addressed and provides the basic motivation for the present paper: what is the market price per ton of CO 2 that would be needed to trigger the adoption of CCS capabilities? To address it, our point of departure is the policy discussion in Herzog (2011) who called for further attention to be paid to the conditions needed for the construction of a large-scale CO 2 pipeline and storage infrastructure to be decided. So far, CO 2 infrastructure issues have predominantly been examined through the application of optimization techniques to identify the cost-minimizing design of an integrated CCS infrastructure network (Bakken and von Streng Velken, 2008; Middleton and Bielicki, 2009; Kemp and Kasim, 2010; Klokk et al., 2010; Mendelevitch et al., 2010; Kuby et al., 2011; Morbee et al., 2012; Oei et al., 2014; Oei and Mendelevitch, 2016 ). Yet, an examination of these prior contributions suggests two possible policy-relevant extensions.
First, in most of these articles, the bulk of the emissions transported and stored is supplied by the power sector which is assumed to play a central role in the analysis. However, Hirschhausen et al. (2012) (Shackley et al., 2004; Riesch et al., 2013; Gough et al., 2014; Braun et al., 2017) ; (ii) the adapted R&D policies for the CCS technology (Eckhause, 2011; Eckhause and Herold, 2014) ; (iii) the design of the fiscal and regulatory incentives needed to foster the rapid and massive adoption of carbon capture capabilities (Comello and Reichelstein, 2014; Banal-Estañol et al., 2016) .
capabilities at thermal generation plants as alternative technologies (e.g., the installation of renewable energy sources) are likely to provide more affordable mitigation options. In contrast, CCS is critically needed to decarbonize other carbon-intensive industries for which there are no other abatement technologies (e.g., cement, iron and steel). As the future prospects for CCS in the power sector are jeopardized, there is a need to examine the economics of a less ambitious CCS deployment that would overlook the power sector and concentrate solely on the other industrial sectors. At first sight, one may infer that the absence of the power sector is likely to make the emergence of CCS even more complex as there will be a smaller volume of CO 2 over which to spread the large fixed costs of the pipeline infrastructure. That said, the exact nature of that effect and its magnitude still have to be documented.
Second, one can remark that the models used in these earlier contributions implicitly posit an idealized industrial organization whereby a unique decision-maker (e.g., a benevolent central planner) is assumed to have total control over the whole CCS chain. However, in reality, the creation of a largescale CCS infrastructure with national scope is subject to the individual decisions to adopt carbon capture capabilities taken by a group of independent emitters. As these emitters are unlikely to strictly obey a "superior" decision-maker, a closer examination of the coordination issues faced by that collection of independent agents is needed. In a recent contribution, Massol et al. (2015) develop a cooperative game theoretic approach to investigate the conditions needed for a collection of emitters to share a common pipeline infrastructure and to determine the break-even price for CCS adoption. Yet, that prior analysis concentrates only on the simplistic case of a point-to-point pipeline system that connects the emitters in Le Havre to a unique storage site located near Rotterdam and posits that emitters have an unique outside option: laying an alternative pipeline along that route. However, in reality, one can envision the deployment of a meshed network infrastructure that has a more flexible morphology and on which one can hardly pair each emitter with a storage location.
The purpose of this paper is thus to examine the conditions for the deployment of a large-scale CO 2 infrastructure project aimed at transporting the CO 2 emissions captured at a series of industrial clusters to a series of storage sites where the CO 2 could be injected into a saline aquifer for permanent storage. To account for the difficulty in organizing the adoption of carbon capture capabilities in the energy sector, our analysis successively considers two scenarios that depend on whether the CO 2 emissions from carbon intensive industrial facilities (iron and steel, cement, pulp and paper) are supplemented or not by the volumes of CO 2 captured at thermal generation plants and oil refineries. 4 We consider Spain as a case study for our analysis because at least three distinct lines of arguments make it an interesting candidate. First, fossil fuels represent 85% of the Spanish primary energy supply, while the 240Mt of CO 2 emitted account for 7.5% of the EU28 total. As a member of the EU, Spain is fully committed to reaching the European objectives of reducing emissions by 40% in 2030 and 85% in 2050 with respect to the 1990 levels. Second, spatial considerations cannot be overlooked. While the North Sea oil fields are recurrently presented as a preferred destination for the CO 2 captured in Europe, the cost of routing the CO 2 captured in Spain to the trunkline systems envisioned in northern Europe would be prohibitive. 4 Third, a remarkable data set on emission sources and storage potentials has recently been assembled for that country under the auspices of COMET, a large project funded by the EU (Boavida et al., 2011 Kanudia et al., 2013) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Spanish case. Section 3 describes the determination of the least-costly CCS infrastructure and identifies three regional subsystems that could be independently deployed in Spain. Section 4 has a methodological nature and explains how the conditions for CCS adoption can be identified using cooperative game-theoretic notions. Section 5 discusses our assumptions regarding the cost of the carbon capture operations conducted at each cluster.
Section 6 presents our results regarding the break-even prices for the deployment of the three regional subsystems and compares them with the values derived from traditional cost-engineering studies that do not take into account the existence of strategic interactions among players connected to a common infrastructure. The last section summarizes our conclusions and highlights the policy implications of our analysis. The detailed numerical assumptions retained for our analysis are presented in Appendix A.
Appendix B presents the detailed specification of the optimization model used to support our analysis.
Background: The Spanish sources of CO 2 and potential sinks
In this section, we first describe the situation of CCS in Spain, in terms of the spatial distribution of emission clusters and storage sites, and the techno-economic characteristics of transport and storage technologies.
4 Oei et al. (2014) formulate an infrastructure planning model aimed at determining the least costly deployment of a European CCS infrastructure. According to their simulation results (see Oei et al., 2014 -figures Instead, we build upon the approach retained in the EU-funded COMET project and follow Boavida et al. (2011 Boavida et al. ( , 2013 who grouped emitters into clusters of reasonable size (see Appendix A).
Our analysis thus considers 16 distinct clusters labeled E1 to E16 (see Table 1 ). 8 The map in Figure 1 illustrates their locations. It should be noted that, with the exception of the Madrid area, these clusters are predominantly located in the coastal regions and their hinterlands, which is consistent with the spatial distributions of the country's population and heavy industries. We consider the construction of a CCS infrastructure that is aimed at being operated during a 30-year planning horizon starting in 2040. This starting date is consistent with both the IEA's future global outlook for CCS which posits that the technology will be commercially available on that date (IEA, 2016) ; and the simulation results of the TIMES model developed under the COMET project that show that a mature CCS infrastructure will need to be installed in Spain on that date (Kanudia et al., 2013) . Figure 1 . The geography of the emission clusters and the candidate pipelines and storage sites
We investigate the possible future deployment of a CCS infrastructure in Spain through two scenarios. The first one is labeled "All" and posits that all the CO 2 that can be captured by the thermal power stations, the cement factories, the oil refineries, the pulp and paper plants, and the iron and steel industries at each of the 16 emission nodes will be captured. The second is labeled "Indus_only" and considers only the emissions from the cement factories, the pulp and paper plants, and the iron and steel industries at clusters where these industries collectively emit at least 1 MtCO 2 /year.
Our motivations for considering the restricted scenario "Indus_only" that omits both the thermal generation plants and the oil refineries are threefold. Firstly, this scenario is consistent with the Spanish coal situation. In recent years, the government has begun to emphasize the need to organize an industrial reconversion of the mining areas, aiming for a gradual closure of the coal mines (Zafrilla, 2014) . 9 As the Spanish coal mining industry is gradually disappearing, one wonders whether there will be a possible decline of coal-based power generation in the country. Secondly, the relevance of carbon capture technologies in the power sector is now being questioned because, in contrast to CCS, (Rosal Fernández, 2000) .
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investment costs for renewables have experienced substantial cost decreases through higher learning effects which have made them a much cheaper abatement option (Hirschhausen et al., 2012; Martinez Arranz, 2015) . In contrast, avoiding CO 2 emissions in the industrial sectors may be more important than in the electricity sector, because in some industries (e.g., cement, iron and steel) low-carbon substitute technologies are more difficult to develop than in the electricity sector, and avoidance costs through the potential use of CCS may also be cheaper. Lastly, our decision to omit the refining sector is justified by the very high cost of equipping these industrial sites with carbon capture capabilities. An oil refinery represents a complex collection of carbon-emitting processing units that all have to be equipped with dedicated carbon capture equipment (Leeson et al., 2017) . Compared to simpler industries like iron and steel or cement where the bulk of the CO 2 emissions generally come from one or two sources, the presence of a much larger number of small emission sources is reputed to make the implementation of carbon capture more technically challenging and expensive.
The "Indus_only" scenario thus echoes these recommendations to (i) abandon the aspiration of a broader deployment of CCS encompassing both the industrial activities and the energy industries, and
(ii) follow a selective deployment aimed at "picking the low hanging fruit." This would be achieved by focusing solely on the heavy industries where carbon capture is both affordable, hardly substitutable, and the least costly mitigation option.
Our assumptions regarding the annual quantities of CO 2 that can be captured under the two scenarios are based on the simulation results of the TIMES model developed by Kanudia et al. (2013) for the COMET project 10 and were constructed as follows. We examine the simulation results of that model for the year 2040 in a mitigation scenario whereby the evolution of the EU energy system is obliged to achieve the EU-2020 targets as well as a 40% reduction of the domestic greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 relative to 1990. 11 These simulation results provide for each emission cluster the annual quantity of CO 2 that will be emitted by the electricity, pulp and paper, cement, refining, and iron 10 We are grateful to Dr. Amit Kanudia (KanORS) for having kindly shared with us the detailed results of the numerous simulations he conducted for the COMET project.
11 Oei and Mendelevitch (2016) and steel plants, respectively. Only a fraction of these emissions can be captured via CCS. In this study, we use the sector-specific capture rates mentioned in Kanudia et al. (2013) : 90% in the electricity and pulp and paper sectors, 85% in the cement and refining sectors, and 65% in the iron and steel sectors.
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As we did not have access to the annual emissions trajectories after the year 2040, we assume that the emission data will remain steady over time.
The annual quantities ij Q of CO 2 captured by the plants in each industrial sector j in each cluster i are detailed in Figure 2 where the color blue (respectively: red, green) is used for the thermal power plants (respectively: the oil refineries, the other industries).
Under the optimistic scenario "All," the total annual quantity that can be captured at these 16 clusters attains 112.7 MtCO2/year which, according to the results of the TIMES-COMET model, represents about 60% of the nation's annual CO 2 emissions at stationary sources in 2040. The power sector (respectively, the refining sector) accounts for 39.7% (respectively, 8.9%) of that capture potential. Hence, it is interesting to highlight: (i) the important weight of the three other industrial sectors which together account for more than half of the total capture potential (58.0 MtCO 2 /year), and
(ii) among them, the large size of the cement sector that represents more than a third of the total capture potential (38.1 MtCO 2 /year). From a spatial perspective, one can remark that the distribution of the clusters' capture potentials is not uniform. An average cluster would have a capture potential of 7.0
MtCO 2 /year but the two largest clusters (namely E2 -the cement plants and heavy industries in Asturias -and E7 the metropolitan area of Barcelona) together account for 24% of the overall capture potential whereas the two smallest clusters (namely E4 near Burgos and E16 near Santander) only capture 2.5% of that total. College (Leeson et al., 2017 Under the restricted scenario "Indus_only," only 12 clusters have a capture potential larger than our 1 MtCO 2 /year threshold. Accordingly, there is no need to consider the emission clusters located in Tarragona (E8), Cartagena (E11), Algeciras (E13), and Santander (E16) in that scenario. The cumulated capture potential of the industrial sites located at the 12 remaining clusters attains 55.2 MtCO2/year, which represents 62.4% of the annual volume of CO 2 emitted by the Spanish pulp and paper, cement, and iron and steel sectors in 2040. The average quantity of CO 2 that can be captured at one of these 12
clusters is 4.9 MtCO 2 /year but, again, the large integrated steel mill located in Asturias (E2) and the cement factories located near Barcelona (E7) and Madrid (E15) have a significantly larger capture potential.
Storage sites
Spain has a favorable geologic endowment in onshore saline aquifers. In a recent geoscience study, Carneiro et al. (2015) examine the techno-economic characteristics (i.e., volume, injection capacities, costs) of the underground structures that could be developed in Spain. Their results indicate that it is technically possible to accumulate up to 10.3 GtCO 2 without incurring a levelized cost of storage 14 larger than €7.2 per ton of CO 2 injected. Building on their analysis, the present study considers the eight cost-effective candidate storage sites mentioned in Figure 1 and listed in 
Pipelines
A dedicated pipeline infrastructure is the only economically viable transportation solution that can carry the large quantities emitted by large stationary sources of CO 2 . In the present analysis, we consider a predefined list of 49 candidate pipelines (cf. Appendix A) that could be installed to connect the emission clusters nodes E1 to E16 with the candidate storage nodes S1 to S8. From that list of candidate pipelines, it is possible to build a realistic network that accounts for Spain's mountainous geography (terrain, landforms, natural transportation corridors). As shown in Figure 1 , these pipelines are located along the country's main transportation corridors.
From a cost perspective, we assume that the total cost to transport a given flow of CO 2 on a pointto-point pipeline system is directly proportional to the length of that pipeline and that the total cost per unit of distance can be decomposed into a fixed investment cost component, a variable investment cost one that is linearly varying with the transported flow of CO 2 and a unit O&M cost. Regarding the pipeline investment cost components, our approach follows the costing methodology used in Morbee et al. (2012) and is detailed in Appendix A. For concision, we simply highlight here that for a 100km-long onshore pipeline aimed at being installed on a flat terrain, we assume an annual equivalent fixed cost of €4.6 million and an annual equivalent variable cost of €0.16 per (tCO 2 ×100 km). As indicated in Appendix A, a correction is applied to these figures to account for the specific nature of terrain observed along each pipeline route. The obtained cost figures are thus specific to each pipeline route.
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Regarding O&M cost, IEA (2005) indicates that the annual operation costs vary between €1.0 and €2.5 per (tCO 2 ×100 km). In our analysis, we use a value of €1.5 per (tCO 2 ×100 km).
Optimal deployment of CCS infrastructure in Spain
In this section, we first examine the least-cost design of CCS infrastructure aimed at storing the quantities of CO 2 captured under the two scenarios. Then, we investigate whether the Spanish infrastructure has to be analyzed as a unique integrated national infrastructure or whether it can be decomposed into a collection of regional subsystems.
The least-costly infrastructure deployment
We have formulated an optimization problem aimed at determining the least-costly design of a CCS infrastructure capable to transport and store the CO 2 captured at the Spanish clusters. This model is formally described in Appendix B. It aims at choosing the pipelines and storage sites (among our predefined and finite list of candidate pipelines and storage sites) that minimize the total annual equivalent cost of building and operating the pipeline and storage infrastructure. More precisely, we adopt a static framework for the year 2040. In that year, the total national demand for capturing CO 2 and hence the annual storage requirement is imposed by our assumption. However, emitting clusters and storage sites need to be connected in a cost-effective manner. The model therefore seeks to minimize the total infrastructure cost by identifying the following optimal decisions: (i) whether, among a finite list of possible pipeline routes (linking either an emission cluster to a storage site, an emission cluster to a transit node, two emission nodes, two transit nodes, or a transit node to a storage site), a given corridor should be open, given its incurred fixed cost of deployment, and the transported quantity on that corridor given the variable operation cost; and (ii) the annual (eventually null) volume of CO 2 injected in each storage site, given an exogenous, site-dependent unit cost of storage operations. As an outcome, we obtain a 2040-based static picture of the optimal -in least-cost sense -CO 2 pipeline network that matches the demand for storage with the existing capacities and possible routes.
We have run this model on the above-mentioned input data to identify the ideal CCS infrastructure under our two capture scenarios. The results are illustrated in At first sight, one could conjecture from the figures detailed below the two maps that the total annual equivalent costs of the infrastructure per unit of CO 2 transported are similar in the two scenarios and thus conclude that the total annual equivalent costs of the infrastructure is directly proportional to the total flow transported. Yet, that first impression is misleading because there are marked differences in the cost structure of the two CCS systems. The pipeline cost figures reveal the presence of important economies of scale: the annual volume of CO 2 transported in the scenario "All" is twice as large as the one in "Indus_only" though the pipeline cost is only 66% percent larger. This result is not surprising as the total lengths of the networks are similar, which suggests that fixed pipeline costs are spread out over more units of output under the scenario "All." In contrast, one can observe that the total storage cost is 2.77 times larger under the scenario "All" as its extra volume of CO 2 saturates the capacity of the least costly storage sites and imposes a mobilization of the more expansive ones in S1 and S8.
From a comparison of these two maps, several findings can be highlighted. First, whatever the scenario under scrutiny, the optimization model does not recommend the construction of a fullyconnected national pipeline system but rather prefers the construction of a fragmented collection of pipelines that are physically disconnected. Second, the morphology of some of these pipeline connections is scenario dependent. In the north, the clusters located at Leon (E3) and Burgos (E4) either form an independent infrastructure or are embedded within a larger northern infrastructure. A similar observation can also be made for the clusters near Valencia (E10) and Almeria (12). The emissions captured in Aragon (E9) are either stored in S2 together with the ones captured along the Atlantic coast (cf., scenario "Indus_only") or are directed to S3 where the CO 2 captured in Catalunya (E7, E8) is also directed (cf., scenario "All"). Hence, the optimal infrastructure deployment decided for the northern emission nodes and the ones located in Catalunya may not be independent. In contrast, the CO 2 captured by the emitters located in the Madrid-La Mancha area (E15) is systematically routed to the neighboring storage S4 located in Cuenca, and that storage site only receives CO 2 from that cluster. One may thus wonder if a CCS deployment in E15 could be organized independently from what is decided in the other clusters.
Regional subsystems
From the graphical insights above, one could conjecture that it may be possible to decompose the national infrastructure into a collection of independent subsystems, that is, subsets of emissions, transit, and storage nodes that interact with each other to organize the CCS chain -sharing costs and possibly connecting to each other, irrespectively of the choices made in other regions of the peninsula. To 15 formally investigate this proposal and determine the boundaries of these regional subsystems, we successively consider the coalitions listed in Table 3 . Each of these coalitions represents a candidate subsystem of emission areas that could potentially be separated from the national system.
For an emissions-transit-storage nodes subsystem, call it S, to be analyzed independently of the rest of the national system, we need to make sure that it does not interact with any other subgroup. From a cost perspective -and as described in the cost optimization model in Appendix B, this means that none of these other subgroups should be willing to join S in the course of satisfying its demand for storage because it would reduce its average cost of serving the demand. In other words, none of the costs of serving S plus another subset should be strictly subadditive, so that no economies of scale can emerge from sharing. All the nodes located in the southern regions of Murcia and Andalucía. {E11, E12, E13, E14}
All the nodes located in the Catalunya and Aragon regions. {E7, E8, E9}
All the northern nodes located along the Atlantic coast. {E1, E2, E16, E5, E6}
The Madrid-La Mancha area alone. {E15}
The Valencia area alone. {E10}
The Murcia region alone. {E11}
The Almeria area alone. {E12}
In formal terms, we let N denote the set of all the emission clusters considered in a given scenario and i Q denote the total annual quantity of CO 2 captured in cluster i . For each coalitions S, we evaluate two types of costs. First, by setting − incremental costs have to be evaluated for each coalition S. If for a given coalition S and any coalition ' S in \ N S , the stand-alone cost ( ) C S equals the incremental cost
, the cost function is said to be separable because it verifies ( ) ( ) ( )
− equality conditions hold, there are no cost interactions between the emission clusters in S and the others in \ N S and one can separately examine the deployment of a CCS infrastructure aimed at solely serving S without paying attention to the other emission clusters.
These cost comparisons 16 reveal that, among all the candidate subsystems listed in Table 3 , only three verify the conditions for a separable cost function: (i) all the nodes located onshore on the Atlantic coast, and the ones in Castilla-León, Aragon, and in the Mediterranean regions of Catalunya and
Valencia, { } E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, E8, E9, E10, E16 , (ii) all the nodes located in the southern regions of Murcia and Andalucía { } E11, E12, E13, E14 , and (iii) the emission cluster located in the Madrid-La Mancha area { } E15 . In the sequel, we thus partition the set of Spanish emission clusters into these three subgroups and independently examine the conditions for the deployment of three autonomous CCS infrastructures that are respectively labeled: North, South and Central. An illustration of that decomposition is presented in Figure 4 .
The annual volumes of CO 2 captured and stored at each infrastructure and the associated infrastructure cost under the two scenarios "All" and "Indus_only" are detailed in Table 4 . The northern infrastructure has by far the largest potential for CO 2 abatement. A rapid division of the total infrastructure cost by the volume of CO 2 captured and stored provides the average transportation and storage cost. These figures indicate that the central infrastructure, which gathers a unique emission cluster, also has the lowest unit cost (less than 7€/tCO 2 p.a. compared to figures larger than 9.3€/tCO 2 p.a. for the other infrastructures). 
Methodology: A cooperative game theoretic framework
In this section, we first provide a non-technical presentation of our cooperative game-theoretic framework. Then, two subsections detail the conditions that have to be verified for the construction of a common infrastructure to be decided. Lastly, we define the break-even CO 2 price for joint CCS adoption and show how it can be evaluated. 
Cooperative game and stability notion
We consider a regional subsystem of emission clusters, like the ones identified in the preceding section, and examine the conditions for the construction of the least-cost (not necessarily fullyconnected) CCS infrastructure in that subsystem, also identified in the previous section.
Hereafter, N refers to the grand coalition joining all the emission clusters in that subsystem: either By nature, a CO 2 pipeline and storage system is a mutualized infrastructure and its cost must be apportioned between all the individuals that feed CO 2 into that system. In this paper, we assume that each emission cluster represents an autonomous decision-making entity that can either feed all the volumes of CO 2 captured by the local emitters to the grand infrastructure, feed them to a different infrastructure or renounce CO 2 capture. The arrangements guiding the internal functioning of that emission cluster will be further discussed below. For the moment, we simply overlook that issue and treat all the emitters in a given emission cluster as a monolithic agent, that is, as an individual player.
Following the cooperative game theoretic approach in Young (1985) , the players are considered to negotiate with each other to determine a binding agreement between them regarding the sharing of the total cost of building and operating the grand infrastructure. To examine the different possibilities within a game for cooperation among players, we must evaluate what cost can collectively be incurred by any subgroup of players S in the set N . Indeed, if a certain subgroup of players assesses that it pays more than it could do by itself then this group may abandon the negotiations with the other players and opt for a stand-alone attitude (i.e., develop its own infrastructure). Our ambition is thus to identify whether or not it is possible to share the total cost of the grand infrastructure in such a manner that no subgroup of players has an incentive to disband. Such a cost allocation is said to belong to the "core" of the cost game.
We shall now specify what a given coalition S can achieve if it decides to opt out from the grand coalition and build an infrastructure aimed solely at serving its own needs. To do so, one should first examine the economic features of the shared elements of the CCS supply chain: the pipeline network and the storage site. Regarding transportation, the technology used in CO 2 pipelines is not proprietary.
Potentially, several pipeline firms may have access to the same technology and may install a pipeline system between a group of emission clusters and some storage sites. In contrast, excludability can be at 19 work on the storage side. At a given storage site, the quantity of CO 2 that can be injected by S plus the total volume injected by the other emission clusters in \ N S cannot exceed the capacity constraint of that storage. Such a capacity constraint creates a mutual influence among coalitions, a feature called an externality among coalitions. In the presence of externalities, the players who are about to deviate must take into account the behavior of the remaining agents because the cost incurred by the deviating coalition -thus the incentive to disband -can vary with the decisions taken by these remaining agents.
Several options can be envisaged to determine the cost incurred by a deviating coalition S that varies with the behavior posited for the remaining agents in \ N S. Most of the literature on cooperative game theory in the presence of externalities makes one of the following two extreme assumptions.
Some papers assume that non-deviating members would stay together (e.g., Horn and Persson, 2001) whereas others assume that they would split apart (e.g., Barros, 1998; Chander and Tulkens, 1997) . 17 In this paper, we take the first approach because we think it is more likely that the remaining coalition members would build a joint infrastructure than they would build many, separate ones independently.
The remaining members of the grand coalition are more likely to have assessed the feasibility of a joint project (including geoscience studies, pipeline routing analyses, permitting procedures).
We use this observation to model the strategic behavior between the two coalitions ( \ N S and S).
We assume that the remaining players in the grand coalition (i.e., the ones in \ N S) collectively conserve a first-mover advantage. That is, they can decide the construction of the least costly CCS infrastructure aimed at serving their own needs without taking into account the volume injected by the other emission cluster in the storage capacity constraint.
We implement these assumptions as follows. First, we determine the optimal transport and storage decisions of the remaining coalition \ N S by solving an instance of the optimization problem in Appendix B where the annual emissions captured by the deviating clusters are
The solution of that mathematical programming problem provides the decision vector chosen by \
N S
and thus the quantities injected at each storage site. Then, we assume that the deviating coalition S observes the injection decisions of its complement \ N S and takes them as given by playing its best response to these injection decisions. 18 By replicating that two-stage numerical procedure for each of
Very few papers consider the optimal reaction of the non-deviating coalition members (an exception involving a game with
only three players is Banal-Estañol et al., 2008 19 To ease the notation, we also let
The core of the cooperative cost game
We now assume that the pipeline and storage infrastructure aimed at serving the needs of the grand coalition N is supplied by a unique operator. The total cost incurred by that operator is ( ) C N . We let ( ) 1 ,..., N r r r = where i r is the amount charged to the emission cluster i , denote the revenue vector charged by that operator. We assume that this operator is compelled to charge a revenue vector that allows him to recover its cost and thus:
( )
(1)
Each coalition of emission clusters S compares: ( )
The set of revenue vectors that verifies conditions (1) and (2) is named the core of the cooperative cost game ( ) * , N C . From an empirical perspective, it is possible to verify that the core is not empty by using a linear programming approach similar to the one presented in Massol et al. (2015, Appendix B) .
The non-emptiness of the core indicates that it is possible for the infrastructure operator to charge a revenue vector that allows him to recover its cost while preventing the secession of the players. 
The individual conditions required for CCS adoption
We now examine the emission clusters' decision to adopt the proposed CCS project. We let i χ denote the unit cost of the carbon capture operations conducted at cluster i . The definition of that unit capture cost will be further discussed in a subsequent section.
For any emission cluster i , the amount ( )
represents its willingness to pay for a CO 2 pipeline and storage service and, thus, the amount ( )
− is its individual net benefit. Because of individual rationality, the infrastructure operator must provide a non-negative net benefit to each individual emission cluster, i.e.:
The break-even price for joint CCS adoption
The analysis in Massol et al. (2015) shows that the condition for the pipeline operator to be able to build the grand infrastructure amounts to set a revenue vector that verifies conditions (1), (2), and (3).
The prevailing carbon price has a direct influence on the individual net benefit of the emission clusters ( )
22 5. Data: The cost of the carbon capture operations
Data: The unit capture costs of the industrial sectors
The cost to build and operate carbon capture equipment is specific to each industrial sector (Leeson et al., 2017) . In this paper, we assume the unit capture costs listed in Table 5 that are based on recent cost engineering analyses. These figures confirm that CO 2 capture is extremely expensive in the oil refining sector. In the other industrial sectors, the magnitude of the capture cost is commensurate with the ones observed in the power sector. 
Cluster agreements and average vs. marginal costs
We consider two extreme assumptions regarding the arrangement guiding the internal functioning of the emission clusters. We first assume that transfers between individual plants in each cluster are feasible. In this case, the individual plants of each cluster will consider the average costs of the plants in the cluster and the overall gains to the cluster in any given coalition, as side payments can be made from the lowest to the highest cost plants to compensate the plants with higher costs. Under that first assumption, i χ the unit cost of the carbon capture operations conducted at cluster i is defined as the volume-weighted average capture cost at that cluster:
where ij Q is the annual quantity of CO 2 captured by the plants in industrial sector j in cluster i .
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As side payments can be difficult to organize, we also consider a second assumption without transfers. In this case, the highest cost plant will be key as the gains obtained by any plant will need to compensate its costs. We are de facto assuming that each individual plant has veto power in the cluster.
Under that second assumption, i χ the unit cost of the carbon capture operations conducted at cluster i is thus defined as follows:
Of course, the reality is somewhere between these two extremes. Still, the differences between them will help us understand how crucial side payments are to the deployment of CCS in Spain.
The unit capture cost at each industrial cluster
Using the unit costs listed in Table 5 , in each cluster we constructed the merit order of the local carbon capture units to calculate the unit capture cost i χ at each industrial cluster under the two scenarios: "All" and "Indus_only." We successively use the two alternative assumptions presented above: i χ is either defined as the volume-weighted average capture cost at that industrial cluster, or the unit capture cost observed at the plant that has the most expansive carbon capture technology among all the plants in the industrial cluster. These figures are detailed in Table 6 .
Observe that in some clusters the difference between the two approaches retained to evaluate the capture costs can be substantial. This difference is particularly salient under the scenario "All" for all the clusters with oil refining activities ( ) E1, E5, E8, E10, E11, E13, E14 . At these clusters, the non-oilrefining sectors will perceive large infra-marginal rents if these players refuse to organize some side payments but that strategy also conveys the risk of substantially raising the break-even price of CO 2 needed for the construction of the infrastructure. Note: # indicates that there are no carbon capture operations conducted at that industrial cluster under the scenario "Indus_only" (see the discussion in Section 2).
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Results and discussion
We now use these unit capture costs together with the transportation and storage costs evaluated with the optimization model in Appendix B to evaluate the break-even price for joint CCS adoption. For each scenario ("All", "Indus_only") and each candidate infrastructure (North, Central, South), we run two instances of the linear programming problem LP1: one assuming that the unit capture cost at each industrial cluster is based on the quantity-weighted average value, and one assuming that this cost equals the marginal value, as shown in equations (8) and (9). The results are presented in Table 7 .
These results convey a series of interesting findings. First, one can compare the break-even prices obtained under the two scenarios for a given assumption regarding the unit capture costs. Interestingly, the break-even prices are slightly lower under the "Indus_only" scenario despite substantially lower volumes of CO 2 over which the fixed costs of the network and storage infrastructure can be spread. This is an important finding as it suggests that CCS can remain a competitive decarbonization option even if 25 the power sector massively opts for renewable energy sources and thus abandons the carbon capture technology. Of course, this result also suggests to concentrate on the "low hanging fruits" by selecting only the industries where the installation of carbon capture technologies is affordable (i.e., by omitting the oil refining sector). Note: (a) These results were obtained using the linear program LP1 and the unit capture costs defined using equation (8).
(b) These results were obtained using the linear program LP1 and the unit capture costs defined using equation (9).
Second, as can be expected, we can see that the required price for the deployment of a CCS infrastructure can be large, especially in the north and south subsystems that gather several emission clusters. This is particularly true for the scenario in which all plants are included ("All"), and in the case of a no-transfer agreement ("marginal").
Third, as can be expected again, one can note that under a given scenario the break-even prices are a bit lower for the quantity-weighted case, as it avoids the veto power of the highest cost plant. It is interesting to highlight that the magnitude of the difference between the marginal and quantity-weighted cases is substantially smaller under the scenario "Indus_only." By construction, this finding is a direct consequence of the unit capture costs listed in Table 6 , yet it suggests that the detailed outcomes of the internal bargaining conducted within each cluster are likely to play a less important role under the scenario "Indus_only."
As a side remark, we note that there is no difference between the marginal and quantity-weighted price in the north subsystem in the "Indus_only" scenario. For that specific scenario, we have closely examined the two solutions of the linear program LP1. By construction, the solution of LP1 is such that at least one of the nine constraints (7) -recall that they state that the individual net benefit of each emission cluster must be non-negative -must be binding. Interestingly, in both cases, there is a unique binding constraint: the one associated with the emission cluster E1 located in A Coruña in Galicia.
Under the scenario "Indus_only," there is only one industrial sector in that cluster (an iron and steel plant -see Figure 2 ) which explains why the unit capture cost at that cluster equals 57.5€/tCO 2 both under the volume-weighted average and marginal methods. The difference between the break-even price and that unit capture cost reveals that a unit amount of 25.12€/tCO 2 is charged to this cluster by the infrastructure operator when the prevailing carbon price equals 2 * CO p . This figure is far larger than the average cost of the infrastructure: 442/41.9 ≈ 10.55€/tCO 2 suggested from the figures in Table 4 . A closer examination of the solution of LP1 reveals that this figure is exactly equal to the incremental cost that E1 imposes on the other emission clusters in the north. Hence, this is the lowest amount that can be charged by the pipeline operator without creating an opportunity for the other emitters to disband. By the way, a quick look at the location of that cluster on the map presented in Figure 4 suggests that this large incremental cost is not so surprising given the relatively small size of that cluster and its remote location (relative to those of the storage site S2).
Beyond the somehow anecdotal nature of that discussion centered on the case of the cluster E1, this analysis strongly questions the validity of the simple accounting-based or cost-engineering-based studies that evaluate the average total cost of a CCS supply chain (by simply dividing the total infrastructure cost by the total quantity stored) and implicitly presume that this figure can be interpreted as the critical price of CO 2 required to trigger the construction of the CCS infrastructure. For example, Table 8 reports two values that could be retained in these simple cost-engineering studies that overlook the complex cost interactions which exist in an infrastructure that has network characteristics. These account the strategic incentives may lead to a significant underestimation of the difficulties of deploying a CCS infrastructure that connects several emission sources. 
Conclusion and policy implications
The question of how to organize the construction of a large-scale CO 2 pipeline and storage system is one of the key issues that policymakers must address to support the large-scale deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies. Previous research on that issue has two limitations that together provide the motivation for the present paper, namely (i) the potential failure of a widespread adoption of CCS in power generation and oil refining sectors, as well as (ii) the need to account for the coordination of actors along the chain to ensure a viable and mutually agreed cooperation at the regional level. This paper thus adopts a spatial approach to clarify the conditions that make the construction of a common pipeline and storage infrastructure with network characteristics a rational move for a set of regional clusters of industrial emitters that could be connected to that infrastructure. It also examines whether these conditions differ or not depending on the installation of carbon capture capabilities in the energy sector (i.e., at power plants, at oil refineries).
Taking Spain as a case study, the paper examines the least costly deployment of a national CCS infrastructure under these two scenarios. A closer analysis of their cost structures (i.e., on the separability of the cost function) reveals an important finding: this national infrastructure can be decomposed into three regionally distinct subsystems located in the north, center and south of Spain, meaning that under no circumstance of the scenarios under scrutiny does a pipeline link any pair of these regions. As these subsystems can be deployed independently, there is no need to concentrate the policymakers' attention on the construction of a grand infrastructure with national scope, but rather a regional approach with respect to the implementation of CCS should be favored.
The paper then examines the economic feasibility of these regional subsystems. Using an adapted cooperative game-theoretic framework, we model the outcomes of the negotiations among the emission clusters that can be connected to these infrastructures and use it to determine the critical values in the charge for CO 2 emissions that makes their constructions possible: the break-even prices for CCS adoption. A comparison of these break-even prices provides a series of interesting findings from a policymaking perspective. Firstly, the non-adoption of CCS technologies in the energy sector does not make the cost of CCS prohibitive. Accordingly, the current lack of progress of CCS in the energy sector
should not discourage its implementation in the other industrial sector (provided sufficient incentives can be set). Secondly, we found that the internal bargaining conducted within each cluster regarding the sharing of the carbon capture cost plays a less important role when the infrastructure stores solely the CO 2 captured at industrial sites (i.e., when the energy sector is not present). We believe that this finding results from a greater homogeneity of the sector-specific costs to implement carbon capture capabilities.
Lastly, this analysis calls for further attention to be paid to the network characteristics of the CCS supply chain when trying to infer the break-even price of these infrastructures. Indeed, preliminary costengineering studies based on average cost concepts may substantially underestimate the true break-even price.
As in any modeling effort, we made simplifying assumptions. We, for instance, neglected the role of uncertainty regarding CO 2 prices. As investments in carbon capture capabilities are irreversible, the presence of uncertainty can influence the emitters' individual decisions and thus the feasibility of a shared infrastructure. Risk-averse owners may thus require a higher premium to compensate for the risk of the investment. Further research could explore whether individual decisions based on a real-options framework can be combined with the cooperative game theoretic approach presented in this manuscript to gain further insights into the development of a CCS infrastructure. Incorporating the system effects of individual decisions (and thus the interactions) within a real-option framework, though, can be a challenging task.
regrouped them into 16 distinct clusters labeled E1 to E16. The following table clarifies the construction of our industrial clusters from the sources of CO 2 considered in the COMET project. The candidate pipelines and their costs
Definition
Each pipeline connects two of 37 nodes: the 16 emission clusters nodes E1 to E16, the eight storage nodes S1 to S8 and the 13 intersection nodes labeled R1 to R13 that are listed in Table A .2. The later nodes represent possible network intersections between at least three pipelines. There are no CO 2 injection into/withdrawal from the network at these nodes. The pipeline investment cost
We follow the standard methodology retained in CO 2 pipeline models and assume that the construction cost of a point-to-point pipeline infrastructure is directly proportional to its length. We thus consider a normalized cost per unit of length and assume that this cost can be evaluated as follows.
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To evaluate the total annual equivalent investment cost of a 100km-long pipeline, we use the pipeline investment cost formula detailed in Morbee et al. (2012) to obtain the total capital expenditures and convert them into an annual equivalent cost using a 7% discount rate and assuming an infrastructure lifetime of 30 years. The annual equivalent investment cost of a 100km-long pipeline that has a steady annual output of q MtCO 2 /year is: ( ) (tCO 2 ×100 km) and τ is the average terrain correction factor described in IEAGHG (2002) and detailed in Table A .2.
Appendix B -Designing an optimal pipeline-storage infrastructure
This Appendix details the optimization problem used to evaluate the least-cost design of a given pipeline-storage infrastructure. We first present the notations before presenting the mathematical formulation of that problem.
Notation
To begin with, we define three sets to identify the nodes of the network: 
